On June 5, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously ruled in favor of petitioner, Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman, who commenced a reverse discrimination case against her former employer, the Ohio Department of Youth Services. [1] The central issue before the Supreme Court was whether a majority-group plaintiff must present additional evidence of their employer’s discriminatory motive to meet their prima facie burden to establish a disparate treatment claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, the Supreme Court vacated the Sixth Circuit’s decision imposing a heightened evidentiary standard on members of a majority group and remanded the matter back to the lower court for application of the proper prima facie standard.
In 2019, Ames, a long-time employee of the Ohio Department of Youth Services, applied for a new management position with the agency. The agency interviewed Ames but ultimately hired a lesbian candidate to fill the role. Thereafter, the agency demoted Ames and hired a gay man to fill her prior role. Ames filed a lawsuit against the agency under Title VII, alleging that she was denied the management promotion and removed from her position due to her sexual orientation.
The District Court granted summary judgment to the agency and dismissed Ames’ discrimination claim based on sexual orientation. The District Court held that without additional evidence of “background circumstances” suggesting that the agency was the rare employer who discriminates against members of a majority group, a plaintiff who is a member of a majority-group—including a heterosexual plaintiff—cannot meet their prima facie burden. The Sixth Circuit affirmed this holding and reinforced a Circuit split regarding different prima facie burdens for majority-group versus minority-group plaintiffs.
Resolving the circuit split, the Supreme Court vacated the Sixth Circuit’s decision and held that the text of Title VII does not distinguish between majority-group and minority-group plaintiffs. The Supreme Court clarified that the text of Title VII instead focuses on individual plaintiffs and their protected characteristics, not their membership in a minority or majority group. Citing to precedent including Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Court held that “discriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress proscribed.”[2] Justice Jackson wrote that the “background circumstances” test flouts that basic principle by requiring majority-group plaintiffs to produce “certain types of evidence…that would not otherwise be required to make out a prima facie case.”
In a concurring opinion drafted by Justice Clarence Thomas and joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch, the two justices criticized the lower courts’ failure to refer to the text of Title VII, exemplifying the issue that “judge-made doctrines have a tendency to distort the underlying statutory text, impose unnecessary burdens on litigants, and cause confusion for courts.” Justice Thomas also noted that the heightened standard imposed by the lower court requires courts to perform the “difficult—if not impossible—task of deciding whether a particular plaintiff qualifies as a member of the so called ‘majority.’”
The Supreme Court’s decision levels the playing field for all plaintiffs who lodge Title VII claims, regardless of membership in a “majority” or “minority” group. It also obviates the need for courts to define on a case-by-case basis who belongs to a “majority” or “minority” group. While the full impact of this historical decision remains to be seen, “majority” group plaintiffs may feel emboldened to file their claims.
Indeed, this opinion seems to cement recent backlash on employers’ diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives.
For more questions about how this might impact your organization, please contact the authors or your GRSM attorney.
[1] Ames v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Services, 605 U. S. ____ (2025).
[2] 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
